Table 13. The response from Kabul involved a predictable combination of derision and alarm, for fear that bargaining will commence on terms beyond the current administrations control. Although Section 2 describes to some capacity that this might be a likely event with the U.S. and China, it is still conceivable that an additional international actor can move into the fray and complicate coordination efforts. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? It involves a group of . Both actors are more optimistic in Actor Bs chances of developing a beneficial AI, but also agree that entering an AI Coordination Regime would result in the highest chances of a beneficial AI. c Perhaps most alarming, however, is the global catastrophic risk that the unchecked development of AI presents. If an individual hunts a stag, he must have the cooperation of his partner in order to succeed. I refer to this as the AI Coordination Problem. This allows for coordination, and enables players to move from the strategy with the lowest combined payoff (both cheat) to the strategy with the highest combined payoff (both cooperate). 2.2 Prominent Actors in International Relations - Pearson Finally, I discuss the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory in practice. However, a hare is seen by all hunters moving along the path. For the cooperator (here, Actor B), the benefit they can expect to receive from cooperating would be the same as if both actors cooperated [P_(b|B) (AB)b_Bd_B]. Weiss, Uri, and Joseph Agassi. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. If, by contrast, the prospect of a return to anarchy looms, trust erodes and short-sighted self-interest wins the day. The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations. The coincident timing of high-profile talks with a leaked report that President Trump seeks to reduce troop levels by half has already triggered a political frenzy in Kabul. The game is a prototype of the social contract. 0000002555 00000 n [9] That is, the extent to which competitors prioritize speed of development over safety (Bostrom 2014: 767). SCJ Int'l L. & Bus. Table 9. hTIOSQ>M2P22PQFAH Therefore, if it is likely that both actors perceive to be in a state of Prisoners Dilemma when deciding whether to agree on AI, strategic resources should be especially allocated to addressing this vulnerability. in . This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. The story is briey told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: "If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach Actor As preference order: CC > DC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CC > CD > DD > DC. Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI . If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. So it seems that the moral of the story is that we are selfish human beings with little patience or trust in others, even if that cooperation meant mutual benefit. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. This is visually represented in Table 4 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. As a result of this, security-seeking actions such as increasing technical capacity (even if this is not explicitly offensive this is particularly relevant to wide-encompassing capacity of AI) can be perceived as threatening and met with exacerbated race dynamics. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People Meanwhile, the harm that each actor can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the actors perceived likelihood that such a regime would create a harmful AI expressed as P_(h|A) (AB)for Actor A and P_(h|B) (AB)for Actor B times each actors perceived harm expressed as hA and hB. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. The 18th century political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously described a dilemma that arises when a group of hunters sets out in search of a stag: To catch the prized male deer, they must cooperate, waiting quietly in the woods for its arrival. 'The "liberal democratic peace" thesis puts the nail into the coffin of Kenneth Waltz's claim that wars are principally caused by the anarchical nature of the international system.' There is a substantial relationship between the stag hunt and the prisoner's dilemma. Nash Equilibrium Examples As a result, a rational actor should expect to cooperate. In each of these models, the payoffs can be most simply described as the anticipated benefit from developing AI minus the anticipated harm from developing AI. How do strategies of non-violent resistance view power differently from conventional 'monolithic' understandings of power? Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. Whereas the short-term impact of AI depends on who controls it, the long-term impact depends now whether it can be controlled at all.[26]. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistan's internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. Scholars of civil war have argued, for example, that peacekeepers can preserve lasting cease-fires by enabling warring parties to cooperate with the knowledge that their security will be guaranteed by a third party. What is coercive bargaining and the Stag Hunt? Give an example One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. [41] AI, being a dual-use technology, does not lend itself to unambiguously defensive (or otherwise benign) investments. We have recently seen an increase in media acknowledgement of the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the negative social implications that can arise from its development. They can cheat on the agreement and hope to gain more than the first nation, but if the both cheat, they both do very poorly. (PDF) THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS I-II - ResearchGate But cooperation is not easy. As a result, concerns have been raised that such a race could create incentives to skimp on safety. The closestapproximationof this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the KyotoProtocolenvironmental treaty. Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. Those who play it safe will choose b Finally, if both sides defect or effectively choose not to enter an AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows: The benefit that each actor can expect to receive from this scenario is solely the probability that they achieve a beneficial AI times each actors perceived benefit of receiving AI (without distributional considerations): P_(b|A) (A)b_Afor Actor A and P_(b|B) (B)b_Bfor Actor B. %%EOF What should Franks do? (lljhrpc). Interestingly enough, the Stag Hunt theory can be used to describe social contracts within society, with the contract being the one to hunt the stag or achieve mutual benefit. 0000004367 00000 n For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI. In this section, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. Does a more optimistic/pessimistic perception of an actors own or opponents capabilities affect which game model they adopt? 4 thoughts on " The Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic 'Stag-Hunt' (2): For example international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an Cooperation under the security dilemma. In testing the game's effectiveness, I found that students who played the game scored higher on the exam than students who did not play. Using their intuition, the remainder of this paper looks at strategy and policy considerations relevant to some game models in the context of the AI Coordination Problem. . Those in favor of withdrawal are skeptical that a few thousand U.S. troops can make a decisive difference when 100,000 U.S. soldiers proved incapable of curbing the insurgency. In the context of international relations, this model has been used to describe preferences of actors when deciding to enter an arms treaty or not. This means that it remains in U.S. interests to stay in the hunt for now, because, if the game theorists are right, that may actually be the best path to bringing our troops home for good. Meanwhile, both actors can still expect to receive the anticipated harm that arises from a Coordination Regime [P_(h|A or B) (AB)h_(A or B)]. The Stag Hunt: A Lesson in Game Theory - Ascenturn This technological shock factor leads actors to increase weapons research and development and maximize their overall arms capacity to guard against uncertainty. Leanna Litsch, Kabul Security Force Public Affairs. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag.
stag hunt example international relations
